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INTERNATIONAL LAW-MEANING OF THE TERM "DECLARATION OF WAR" 
As UsED IN A TIME CHARTER-A time charter provided that either party 
should have a right to cancel "if war is declared against any present NATO 
countries. . . ." Respondent-owners, having invoked this clause shortly 
after the Suez crisis erupted into open warfare, contended that a speech de-
livered by Egyptian President Nasser constituted a declaration of war. 
The speech in question, which was delivered to a large public gathering in 
Cairo, broadcast throughout Egypt and subsequently published, de-
clared in- part, "We shall fight as we have always said in a total war."1 It 
urged the people to "fight and never surrender."2 In libels for breach of the 
charter, held, libels dismissed. The speech constituted a "declaration of war" 
within the intended meaning of the cancellation clause. Navios Corporation 
v. The Ulysses II, (D.C. Md. 1958) 161 F. Supp. 932. 
This case appears to be the first in which the meaning of the term "dec-
laration of war" has been considered. With the exception of the Third 
Hague Convention of 1907, no international agreement has attempted to 
define either the form or the function of a declaration of war.3 Thus any 
development and application of a formula to determine whether a particu-
lar utterance is a declaration of war must be based primarily upon a study 
of previous utterances generally considered to have functioned as such. 
1 Principal case at 935. 
2lbid. 
3 STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, c. XI, §6 (1954). The rules 
developed by the Third Hague Convention, however, appear to have been formulated 
primarily for the purpose of inducing nations to declare war before the commencement 
of hostilities. See 36 Stat. 2259 (1907). The only form prescribed was that the declaration 
must be unmistakable and state the reason for the impending conflict. 
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During the past four centuries,4 declarations of war quite often have been 
issued at home after the commencement of hostilities and without formal 
delivery or communication to the enemy. Commonly, such declarations have 
served to notify non-participating powers of the status of the issuing sover-
eign, prepare the political structure and the populace for war, and place 
blame upon the other party by appropriate wording of the declaration.6 
Thus the criteria used by the court here to determine the principal issue 
are consistent with the pattern set by recent declarations. These criteria 
include the fact that the utterance may be either written or oral, and no 
special form need be followed. It must, however, consist of a single state-
ment and must (1) emanate from a proper authority, (2) be publicly an-
nounced and communicated to other governments, and (3) say that war 
exists or is intended to exist.6 The real controversy in the principal case lay 
in the application of this rule to the facts. In answer to plaintiff's conten-
tion that the speech was hortatory, the court replied that many declarations 
of war have taken this form,7 that the speech was adjusted to the people's 
level of understanding, and that it clearly implied that war existed or was 
intended to exist.8 It was also noted that the Egyptian government issued 
a statement through its embassies to the press that the speech had been in-
tended as a declaration of war, and that Nasser had much to gain and little 
to lose by declaring war.9 Other factors, however, cast some doubt upon the 
correctness of the court's conclusion. Whether a state of war in a legal 
4 Back in the Roman Era and the Middle Ages it was customary to notify the ad-
versary of intended war by Letters of Defiance or by heralds at arms ceremoniously 
presented in the enemy camp. 2 PHILLIPSON, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT 
GREECE AND ROME 197-199 (1911). 
5 See generally, Eagleton, "The Form and Function of the Declaration of War," 32 
AM. J. INT. L. 19 :it 32-34 (1938); MAURICE, HoSTILmES WITHOUT DECLARATION OF WAR 
9 (1883); GROB, RELATIVITY OF WAR AND PEACE 285 (1949); U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS 90, 103, 117-118, 225-226 (1917). 
6 Principal case at 941. No single authority provides a test as comprehensive or 
concise as that given by the court. The test was formulated by the court principally upon 
the authority of two expert witnesses, Dr. Clyde Eagleton of New York University for 
the respondent and Dr. Phillip Jessup of Columbia University for the libelant. It is 
interesting to note that the opinions of these two experts were opposed as to whether 
the speech was a "declaration of war." See, generally, 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d 
ed., 1694-1695 (1945); 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 7th ed., 294, n. 1 (1952); Eagleton, 
"The Form and Function of the Declaration of War,'' 32 AM. J. INT. L. 19 at 23 (1938); 
3 A NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (Oxford) 98 (1897); U.S. NAVAL 
WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAw DOCUMENTS (1917); 4 DEPT. OF STATE BUL., March 1, 
1941, 224-227. 
7 See Eagleton, "The Form and Function of the Declaration of War," 32 AM. J. INT. 
L. 19 at 33-34 (1938); MAURICE, HOSTILmES WITHOUT DECLARATION OF WAR 9 (1883). There 
is no doubt that many declarations of war, in addition to making formal announcement 
of a state of war, were calculated to arouse the people. This fact, however, does not 
detract from the requirement that the declaration otherwise state that "a war exists or 
is intended to exist." 
s Principal case at 942. 
o Principal case at 942-943. 
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sense exists between nations is largely a question of intent.10 This intent 
may be left to inference gained fro~ relevant facts and circumstances,11 
but when one nation declares war a state of war exists even in the absence 
of military conflict because the declarant has made known his intent and 
has put the matter beyond any question or doubt.12 The essential function 
of a declaration, then, seems to be to furnish conclusive evidence that the 
declarant intends a state of war to exist between the nations specified.18 It 
would seem to follow that the purported declaration should contain words 
which in themselves "say that a war exists or is intended to exist;"14 other-
wise the question of the declarant's intent would not be conclusively de-
termined. Indeed, the operative portions of recent declarations of war have 
invariably been worded in formal, unequivocal language.15 Nasser's speech, 
therefore, seemingly should not have been classified as a declaration of war, 
since it is neither definite nor unequivocal. At noted by the court, Nasser 
was fighting for his political life.16 Further, Egypt had suffered serious dam-
age in conflict precipitated by his government's policies. The speech was 
apparently no more than an attempt to rally the populace through an ap-
peal to a spirit of nationalism. Nor is the decision beyond question in terms 
of the purpose of the clause in issue. In recent years, charter-parties and in-
surance policies have commonly contained a clause providing for cancella-
tion or non-coverage in the event certain countries became engaged or in-
volved in war.17 Interpretation of these terms has varied18 and the difficulty 
in determining when a state of war exists has become apparent. When 
actual aggression produces a sharp rise in rates, an owner might be wise to 
10 LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7th ed., 309 (1923); Wright, 
"Changes in the Conception of War,'' 18 AM. J. !NT. L. 755 at 758-759 (1924); McNair, 
"The Legal Meaning of War and the Relation of War to Reprisals," II GROTIUS SOCIETY 
TRANSACTIONS 29 at 45 (1926). But see Kfil.sEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (1952). 
The subject is discussed at length in McDougal and Feliciano, "The Initiation of Coer-
cion,'' 52-AM. J. INT. L. 241 (1958). 
11 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d ed., 1693-1694 (1945); Wright, "Changes in the 
Conception of War,'' 18 AM. J. INT. L. 755 at 758-759 (1924); McNair, "The Legal Mean-
ing of War, and the Relation of War to Reprisals,'' II GROTIUS SOCIETY TRANSACTIONS 29 
at 45 (1925). 
12 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 2d ed., 1693-1694 (1945); Wright, "Changes in the 
Conception of War,'' 18 AM. J. INT. L. 755 at 758-759 (1924); 7 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW DIGEST 153-154 (1906). 
13 Eagleton, "The Form and Function of the Declaration of War,'' 32 AM. J. INT. L. 
19 at 21-22 (1938). But see GROB, RELATIVITY OF WAR AND PEACE 290-302 (1949). 
14 Principal case at 941. 
15 See compilations in 4 DEPT. OF STATE BUL., March I, 1941, 224-227; U.S. NAVAL 
WAR CoLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DOCUMENTS (1917). 
16 Principal case at 943. 
17 See, e.g., Kawasiki Kisen v. Bantham SS Co., [1939] 2 K.B. 544; Kawasiki Kisen 
v. Belships Co., 63 LI. L. Rep. 175 (1939); Beley v. Pennsylvania Mutual Life Ins. Co., 
373 Pa. 231, 95 A. (2d) 202 (1953); Gudewia v. John Hancock Mutual life Ins. Co., 331 
Mass. 752, 122 N.E. (2d) 900 (1954). 
ISScc, e.g., cases cited in note 17 supra. 
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invoke the cancellation clause and later take his chance in court. By re-
stricting the right to cancel only "if war is declared," libelant apparently 
sought both to avoid loss of the charter due to mere aggression of a limited 
or informal nature, and to avoid interpretative uncertainties by establishing 
a test for the right to cancel more susceptible of precise definition than a 
"state of war" limitation. It does not appear that the court has allowed 
libelant the benefit of his bargain. 
Glenn O. Fuller 
